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Abstract
We investigate, by method of statistical survey, people’s attitudes toward privacy, trust and personal in-
formation sharing in the context of price discrimination eﬀects in the mobile telecom market, by asking
a selection of 546 individuals, a sample size that is suﬃcient to be representative for the Norwegian mo-
bile market of consumers. Common wisdom tells that people value their privacy, but not much facts have
been collected about how much people value privacy, say, as consumers of speciﬁc services in the mobile
market. Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that individuals will diﬀer in their negotiability of personal
information vs price of service. In this study, we measure a strong privacy negotiability correlated to age
and income, thus conﬁrming common intuition about this. We ﬁnd that technically assuring anonymity
of service will signiﬁcantly aﬀect and facilitate the user’s willingness to release personal information to the
service provider, in particular with respect to information about speciﬁc buying preferences and frequent
travel destinations. Somewhat surprising, a practice of targeted advertisement in exchange for lower mobile
service price is acceptable to about half the population.




This paper reports on a survey aimed at mapping people’s attitudes about pri-
vacy and personal information in the context of the mobile telecom market. The
inspiration for this inquiry stems from the thesis of Odlyzko [5]: the counteraction
between price discrimination in the market and privacy laws. Our survey investi-
gated the Norwegian mobile telecom market and is based on 546 respondents.
Table 1 shows the total number of mobile phone subscriptions per December
31 in the years 1997 through 2004. The Norwegian population in 1.1.2006 was
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Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Subscr. 1676 763 2106 414 2744 793 3339 936 3766 431 3911 136 4163 381 4716 090
Table 1
The number of mobile phone subscriptions as of December 31 from 1997 to 2004. (Source: Norwegian
Post and Telecommunications Authority)
4,640,219, so currently there are more mobile phone subscriptions than people in
Norway.
Crucial to the ability to perform price discrimination is the available technical
means to group and identify customers, and monitor and analyze request and pur-
chase behavior in order to optimize the correct pricing. The general developments of
eﬀectiveness in information and communication technology are very much support-
ing this ability. The longer term questions which may be raised are in which domains
these mechanisms are located in the systems, at the user terminal, in the protocols
or part of the networked servers. These are important engineering questions in
itself, but answers to these questions may also contribute to our understanding of
why most of the many ingenious academic proposals for privacy-protecting ICT sys-
tems have not been put into practice, for instance digital cash and pseudonymous
transactions.
Special price for you
Price discrimination is an economic term for describing that a seller oﬀers the
same (or almost the same) product or service at a price dependent on some charac-
teristics, or negotiation with, the buyer. Commonly agreed economic understanding
states that this has advantages both for seller and buyer [5]. A direct implication
of this thinking is that the seller needs to acquire information about the prospective
buyer in order to distinguish customers and set the optimal price. Hence, the ra-
tional seller will drive to use eﬃcient methods of collection and access to personal
data that can be used to distinguish the buyers.
On the other side, this force is counteracted to some extent by the society’s con-
struction of regulations and legislation of personal data protection in the business
sector. Some will take the position that this can be seen as a particular example
of the free vs. regulated market contention, where the good is ’personal infor-
mation’ [4]. In the Norwegian jurisdiction, the laws putting restrictions on per-
sonal information are; “Personopplysningsloven”, directly based on EU’s Directive
95/46/EC, on the collection and processing of personal data; “Markedsføringsloven”
(Marketing law) on the commercial usage of personal data; and the “Ekom” law
that speciﬁcally rules the telecom industry and market.
To gain insight into this phenomenon by exploring empirical evidence, we ven-
tured to ask a representative selection of the customer population in the mobile
communications market in Norway about their attitude toward release personal in-
formation in exchange for some advantage, such as a reduced subscription price,
what is perceived as common practice for acquiring and use of personal information
within the legal regulations, and how is the collected personal information actually
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exploited in the strategy and marketing of the companies. Is the eﬀective market
of telecommunication undermined by the Norwegian and EU legal regulations of
privacy? Conversely, is it so that price discrimination of telecom products and ser-
vices represent a major threat to the privacy of consumers? If so, does there exist
means of information structure and technology organization, such as anonymous
and aggregated statistical data, that may satisfy both ends?
Related work
In unpublished work by Wathieu and Friedman (2005) not yet available to us
but referred to in [2]; they suggest that privacy concerns are sensitive to indirect
consequences of information transmission. In particular, they argue that personal
information may not have intrinsic value, and the ﬂow of personal information may
not be the key privacy concern. Rather, it is the concern about information use
that aﬀects consumer behavior. Their argument was supported in an experiment
that involved 647 subjects from a U.S. business school research pool.
Hui [2] reviews some empirical studies that have been carried out recently. An
online survey of U.S. 381 respondents in 1998 found that 58% would report income,
investments, and investment goals to obtain customized advice, but only 35% would
also reveal their name and address. The Pew Internet and American Life Project
found in 2000 that among 1017 American Internet users, 54% would provide per-
sonal information in order to use a web site, whereas 27% would never provide
personal information to web sites. A survey of 1200 respondents, aged 18 years
and up, and used Internet from home, showed that most who did not accept a web
site’s data collection policy would nevertheless disclose their real name and email
address if they valued the web site. This survey was carried out by University of
Pennsylvania in 2003. Ref. [2] also refers to an online survey with 415 respondents
carried out by Earp and Baumer in 2003. One of 30 web pages of well or lesser
known retail, medicalhealth, and ﬁnancial sites was randomly chosen and shown to
each respondent. Respondents were most willing to reveal gender and age, and least
willing to reveal their social security numbers. They were signiﬁcantly less willing to
provide personally identiﬁable data (phone number, home address, email address,
social security number, credit card number) to lesser known than well-known web
sites.
2 Method
The empirical methodology used in our study is a cross-sectional (tverrsnittsun-
dersøkelse) survey with anonymous questionnaires, based on the recommendations
in [7]. The inquiry instrument of questionnaires requires much less resources than
interviews. A large part of the survey was easily set up and automated by an ex-
isting web server application at the university [3]. This mode of data collection is
advantageous because it sets no restrictions on geography, time of day, or availabil-
ity of the survey conductor, and the raw data is recorded in a structured digital
format.
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A stratiﬁed selection approach with randomization was used to get a represen-
tative population, by using several source situations. The invitation to take part in
the survey included the use of e-mail distribution lists. Moreover, paper question-
naires handed out and collected by the conductors were also used to avoid potential
skewed representation of groups of users. This included paper based questionnaire
handed out and collected in the shopping street of Trondheim, at Secondary Schools
(Videreg˚aende skole), and employees at two industrial companies.
The survey acquisition period was about one month in the spring of 2004, re-
sulting in a total of 546 respondents. A size of 500 to 1500 individuals is normally
considered suﬃcient for Norwegian market research.
The survey aimed at collecting individual information about:
(i) The standard demographic variables of age, gender, and income level.
(ii) The level of mobile phone usage and spending.
(iii) The appreciations and apprehensions related to privacy, price and trust in
mobile operators and public authorities.
(iv) The awareness of privacy legislation and rights with respect to personal infor-
mation processing by organizations.
(v) Identify the types of personal information that are useful in price discrimi-
nation, and measure how willing users are to release personal information in
return for mobile operator services.
The identiﬁcation and selection of interesting variables for price discrimination
to be put in the questionnaire resulted from interviews with marketing specialist in
two large Norwegian mobile operators Telenor and Netcom, and from ﬁndings in a
forerunner project [1].
The exact phrasing of the questionnaire questions is of course of utter impor-
tance to the respondents correct and non-ambiguous understanding. A preliminary
questionnaire was made and tested on about ten students at our university, in order
to provide feedback and advice on the interpretation and response of the question
formulation. Some questions are measured with nominals (e.g. Yes/No), others
with a range of ordinals (e.g. on a scale from 1 to 5).
It seemed interesting to probe for a diﬀerence in the reluctance to release per-
sonal data in name (nonymous) as opposed to anonymous. Intuitively, the privacy
negotiability is probably dependent on this. The idea was that this could make it
interesting to price discriminate anonymously, like child/adult bus ticket.
The questionnaire is in Norwegian, but an English translation can be found in
the appendix. It contains 19 variables.
3 Survey Results
The survey population comprised 546 individuals, where 55% were male and 45%
female. 39% were under 18 years of age, 41% were between 18 and 30 years. 8%
spent over one hour per day by mobile phone calls, and 70% used the mobile phone
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Willingness to release personal data
Type of data Nonymous Anonymous Increase
Age 91,9 95,8 3,9
Email address 50,0 51,5 1,5
Interests 67,0 80,0 13,0
Maritial status 57,7 76,7 19,0
Education 63,0 82,2 19,8
Occupation 51,5 67,8 16,3
Travel destinations 50,0 72,3 22,3
Shopping preferences 26,7 59,2 32,5
Income 22,3 50,5 28,2
Children 36,3 57,7 21,4
Table 2
The percentage of the population willing to release personal data to a mobile operator, either in full name
or anonymously.
Degree of acceptance
Income(kNOK) Negligible Little Medium Much Very Much Total
< 50 3 6 20 64 81 174
50− 100 6 9 15 45 60 135
100 − 300 25 9 22 31 24 111
300 − 500 18 31 4 27 3 83
> 500 21 9 10 3 43
Total 73 64 71 170 168 546
Table 3
Response to the question: Mobile operators collect personal information in order to oﬀer users and groups
of users more specialized services: To which degree do you accept that they get access to this kind of
personal information if you will pay less for your mobile phone usage?
Degree of acceptance
Level of use Negligible Little Medium Much Very Much Total
> 1 hour/day 5 6 4 17 10 42
> 1 call/day 50 69 111 126 27 383
Daily 6 22 29 9 3 69
2− 5calls/week 9 18 10 0 0 37
Seldom 3 8 3 1 0 0 15
Total 73 123 157 153 40 546
Table 4
Response to the question: Mobile operators collect personal information in order to oﬀer users and groups
of users more specialized services: To which degree do you accept that they get access to this kind of
personal information about you if you get a service menu and subscription adapted to your needs?
several times per day, whereas the rest used it more seldom.
More details on correlation and hypothesis testing results on the survey data
can be found in [8]. The essential tallies from the survey are given here.
Table 2 shows the percentage of the population that is willing to give speciﬁc
data to mobile operators. Signiﬁcantly more people are willing to state personal
data anonymously than nonymously.
Table 3 relates the ﬁgures between level of yearly income and the willingness to
release personal information listed in Table 2 in exchange for a lower service cost.
Table 4 relates the ﬁgures between level of mobile phone usage and the willing-
ness to release personal information listed in Table 2 in exchange for personalized
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service.
4 Discussion and Inferences
We wanted to investigate the privacy negotiability of consumers in the mobile tele-
com market in Norway. By the term privacy negotiability we mean a person’s
willingness to release information about himself or herself in exchange for some
service or good. Here is a short list of the ﬁndings:
Privacy negotiability. Overall, there is a strong privacy negotiability with re-
spect to mobile telecom services in the population.
Age and income. There is a strong (negative) correlation between income and
privacy negotiability. The younger earn less and are most willing to exchange
personal data in exchange for lower mobile service price. This is according to
intuition.
Anonymity. Anonymity facilitates the user’s privacy negotiability in general, this
eﬀect is strongest with respect to information about buying and travel destination
preferences, and income level.
Privacy legislation. The awareness and knowledge of the Norwegian privacy leg-
islation and the individual’s inspection rights on service provider’s databases are
weak.
Targeted ads. Targeted advertisement (”mobile push”) in exchange for lower mo-
bile service price is acceptable to about half the population, also here the tendency
is strongly correlated with income level and age.
Personalized service. The negotiability of personal data and call statistics in
exchange for quality of service is strongest for the big mobile service spenders.
Future work
It seems interesting to try to validate our ﬁndings by setting up a more realistic
behavioural experiment with respondents rather than just answering a questionnaire
without explicit incentives, so we have worked out an experimental set up for this.
Moreover, it seems interesting to investigate similar variables in other markets, such
as the Internet Service Providers and Web Commerce, to make a comparative study.
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A The Questionnaire
Introduction.
Do you have 5 minutes to answer some questions about mobile telephony and privacy? [...half a page
of introduction text left out here.]
Questions.
(i) To which degree do you think about which personal data you give to your mobile operator in estab-
lishing the customer relationship? (scale 1-5)
(ii) To which degree do you think about which rights you give your mobile operator (logging of calls,
duration etc) when establishing the customer relationship? (scale 1-5)
(iii) Mobile operators collect information about you in market surveys, oﬀers, etc. To which degree to you
think about which personal data you give your mobile company in this respect? (scale 1-5)
(iv) The law gives you rights with respect to a company’s processing, use and storage of your personal
data. How well do you know the following rights? (scale 1-5)
(a) The right to revoke your consent about using your personal data.
(b) The right to be informed about how the company is using your personal data.
(c) The right to inspect the personal data stored about you.
(v) Are you willing to receive commercial ads to your mobile phone if you get:(scale: yes, indiﬀerent, no)
(a) Gratis SMS service.
(b) Gratis MMS service.
(c) Gratis call time.
(vi) How willing are you to let mobile operators use information about you in their generation of product
oﬀering and marketing if you get: (scale 1-5)
(a) A more adapted subscription and service menu.
(b) Lower service charge.
(vii) Mobile operators collect personal information in order to oﬀer users and groups of users more spe-
cialized services: (scale 1-5)
(a) To which degree do you accept that they get access to this kind of personal information about
you?
(b) To which degree do you accept that they get access to this kind of personal information about
you if you get a service menu and subscription adapted to your needs?
(c) To which degree do you accept that they get access to this kind of personal information if you
will pay less for your mobile phone usage?
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(viii) Which personal data, not already provided to mobile operator, are you willing to release in return
for ’tailormade’ services and prices for you? (scale yes, no)
(a) Age
(b) E-mail address




(g) Travel destinations (business and leisure)
(h) Shopping practice
(i) Income
(j) Number of children
(ix) New technology makes it possible for mobile operators to know your whereabouts by signalling from
your mobile phone. (scale 1-5)
(a) To which degree do you agree that mobile operators inspect such information?
(b) To which degree do you consent that mobile operators can use this type of information about
you in developing and marketing services?
(c) To which degree do you consent that the authorities can inspect this information for criminal
investigations?
(x) All information you have provided to your mobile operator can be revoked, if you so wish. To which
degree are you willing to release more personal data if the mobile operator told you about this right,
in comparison to be ignorant about this? (scale 1-5)
(xi) To which degree do you trust that your mobile operator will not use the personal data for other
purposes than intended? (scale 1-5)
(xii) To which degree do you trust that the authorities are able to detect misuse of personal data you have
given your mobile operator? (scale 1-5)
(xiii) To which degree do you trust that the authorities have the capability to stop such misuse by mobile
operators? (scale 1-5)
(xiv) If you can give personal data anonymously, so that they cannot be directly linked to you, which
information would you then be willing to release to your mobile operator? (scale yes, no)
(a) Age
(b) E-mail address




(g) Travel destinations (business and leisure)
(h) Shopping practice
(i) Income
(j) Number of children
(xv) How often do you use your mobile phone? (scale: > 1 hour, > 1 call/day, 1 call/day, 2-5 calls/week,
seldom, never)
(xvi) Gender
(xvii) Age (scale: < 18, 18 − 30, > 30)
(xviii) Income (scale in kNOK: < 50, 50 − 100, 100 − 300, 300− 500, > 500)
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